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Summary 
In the absence of significant greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation, many analysts project that 
atmospheric concentrations of species identified for control in the Kyoto protocol could 
exceed 1000 ppm (carbon-dioxide-equivalent) by 2100 from the current levels of about 435 
ppm. This could lead to global average temperature increases of between 2.5 and 6°C by 
the end of the century. There are risks of even greater warming given that underlying 
uncertainties in emissions projections and climate response are substantial. Stabilization of 
GHG concentrations that would have a reasonable chance of meeting temperature targets 
identified in international negotiations would require significant reductions in GHG 
emissions below “business-as-usual” levels, and indeed from present emissions levels. Nearly 
universal participation of countries is required, and the needed investments in efficiency and 
alternative energy sources would entail significant costs. Resolving how these additional 
costs might be shared among countries is critical to facilitating a wide participation of large-
emitting countries in a climate stabilization policy. The 2°C target is very ambitious given 
current atmospheric concentrations and inertia in the energy and climate system. The 
Copenhagen pledges for 2020 still keep the 2°C target within reach, but very aggressive 
actions would be needed immediately after that. 
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In the absence of significant greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation, many analysts project that 
atmospheric concentrations of species identified for control in the Kyoto protocol could 
exceed 1000 ppm (carbon-dioxide-equivalent) by 2100 from the current levels of about 435 
ppm. This could lead to global average temperature increases of between 2.5 and 6° C by the 
end of the century. There are risks of even greater warming given that underlying 
uncertainties in emissions projections and climate response are substantial. Stabilization of 
GHG concentrations that would have a reasonable chance of meeting temperature targets 
identified in international negotiations would require significant reductions in GHG 
emissions below “business-as-usual” levels, and indeed from present emissions levels. Nearly 
universal participation of countries is required, and the needed investments in efficiency and 
alternative energy sources would entail significant costs. Resolving how these additional 
costs might be shared among countries is critical to facilitating a wide participation of large-
emitting countries in a climate stabilization policy. The 2°C target is very ambitious given 
current atmospheric concentrations and inertia in the energy and climate system. The 
Copenhagen pledges for 2020 still keep the 2°C target within a reach, but very aggressive 
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1.  Where are we headed in the absence of climate policy? 
Climate change may pose substantial risks to natural and human systems (IPCC, 2007). In the 
absence of a policy that targets a reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, projected “likely” 
temperature increases by the end of the century are in the range of 2.4 - 6.4°C above pre-industrial levels. 
The IPCC defines “likely” as a 66% chance or greater. 
(IPCC, 2007).
1 A recent MIT study with updated climate and 
socioeconomic parameters provide even higher values:  a 
90% range of 3.8 - 7°C with a mean value of 5.2°C (Sokolov 
et al, 2009).  
There are many efforts to project future emissions trends 
and the range of projections over the 21
st century is wide. 
GDP and population growth are major determinants of 
emissions growth, while increases in energy efficiency (e.g., 
cars with an ability to drive longer distances per unit of fuel, 
or buildings that require less energy to heat them) and 
increasing costs of fossil fuels had the opposing effect on 
emissions. Most likely, economic growth will remain a major 
factor in driving up emissions, whereas the role of population 
will slowly fade over time as most population projections 
forecast a stabilization of the world population in the second 
half of the 21
st century. What differs most across forecasting 
models, hence causing the uncertainty affecting projections, 
are the assumptions concerning future GDP growth; the 
availability of fossil resources; the pace and direction of 
technical change, in turn affecting the cost of low-carbon technologies and the energy intensity of the 
economy; and behavioural shifts, affecting energy demand.  Whether or not the world undertakes 
significant policy directed toward reducing GHG emissions is an additional uncertainty on top of various 
economic forces that will play out over the century. 
In the absence of a climate stabilization policy, energy-related CO2 emissions (the primary GHG) are 
projected to increase substantially during the 21
st century. Figure 1 shows the range of projections in a 
                                                 
1 To date, temperatures are estimated to have risen by approximately 0.75°C relative to pre-industrial (year 1750) 
levels. 
Glossary: 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG): a gas 
that affects a temperature of the 
Earth. 
Kyoto Gases: six GHGs covered 
by the Kyoto Protocol: CO2, CH4, 
N2O, SF6, HFCs, PFCs. 
Gt: gigatonne is 1 billion (10
9) 
tonnes. 
ppm: parts per million by volume, 
or ppm, is a metric to express gas 
concentration in the atmosphere. It 
can refer to concentration of CO2 
only, ppm CO2, or all GHGs 
converted to CO2, ppm of CO2 
equivalent.  
Equivalent CO2 (CO2e): is the 
concentration of CO2 that would 
cause the same level of radiative 
forcing as a given type and 
concentration of greenhouse gas. 
Radiative forcing: difference 
between incoming and outgoing 
radiation energy; the metric for 
radiative forcing is watt per square 
meter.3 
 
recent model comparison exercise organized by Energy Modeling Forum, EMF 22
2 (Clarke et al, 2009).
3 
On average fossil fuel CO2 emissions grow from about 30 Gt CO2 in 2000 to almost 100 Gt CO2 by 2100. 
The contribution of different regions to global emissions is more stable across models. OECD 
countries contribute 15-25% to total emissions in 2100. The USA continues as one of the main emitters 
among the OECD countries. However, its projected global emissions share decreases from the current 
25% to 10% by the end of the century. A major role of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries 
is foreseen, contributing by 2050 around 45-50% of total fossil CO2 emissions. Consistently across 
models, at least 25% of the total emissions are attributed to China from 2020 onward. India, now 
accounting for 10% of global emissions, reaches on the order of 15% by mid-century. The rest of the 
























Figure 1. Energy-Related CO2 emissions projections over 21
st century 
Source: Authors calculations drawing from the EMF 22 dataset. 
 
Anthropogenic CO2 emissions are mostly energy-related, with a contribution from industrial 
processes (mostly cement production) and land use change. Over time, energy-related emissions are 
projected to grow faster than other emissions. While CO2 is a major contributor towards global warming, 
other greenhouse gases (GHGs) also play a substantial role, especially methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(N2O), and a group of so-called F-gases (HFCs, PFCs, and SF6)
4. Currently, non-CO2 gases contribute 
about 25% of total GHG emissions in warming equivalents over their atmospheric life span (IPCC, 2007). 
                                                 
2 The EMF 22 International Scenarios engaged ten of the world's leading integrated assessment models (IAMs) to 
focus on the combined implications of different long terms stabilization targets, the possibility for transitory 
overshooting of those targets, and that of partial versus complete country participation. Four of the IAMs 
participated with two alternative versions for a total of 14 models. 
3 The range in Figure 1 does not represent the full uncertainty in the models projections, rather it shows a range of 
the median projections from each model. 
4 The major sources of F-gases are air conditioning, semiconductor production, electrical switchgear, aluminum and 
magnesium production. 4 
 
CO2 emissions are projected to grow faster than non-CO2 emissions over the 21
st century. Among CO2 
emissions, land use emissions are also an important part of the story. The latest IPCC report estimates that 
destruction of tropical forests and peat lands contributed 18% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions in 
2004. Emissions from deforestation come primarily from a subset of tropical countries, like Brazil, 
Indonesia, and some countries in Central and Western Africa. Reduced deforestation in these countries 
and reforestation of temperate regions could contribute to mitigation efforts. 
Emissions projections, absent significant policy show continued rapid increases in global 
concentrations of GHGs.  The EMF-22 scenarios discusses above result in CO2-equivalent concentrations 
of 800-1500 ppm by 2100 counting concentrations of the gases identified for control in the Kyoto 
protocol, up from 420 ppm in 2000. Other substances will also affect future climate. These include the 
CFCs, whose emissions are largely phased out under the Montreal Protocol, but that remain in the 
atmosphere as a powerful contribution to warming, and other short lived substances some of which are 
warming (e.g., ozone and particulates) and some cooling (e.g., sulfates). Prinn et al (2011) evaluated the 
climate impacts of all of these substances from a range of scenarios in the literature, including those 
developed by intergovernmental panels (represented by IPCC), national governments (selected scenarios 
from the U.S. government Climate Change Science Program, US CCSP), and industry (represented by 
Royal Dutch Shell plc. In the no-climate-policy scenarios, the CO2-equivalent concentrations of GHG 
reach up to 1780 ppm. The Prinn et al (2011) study finds global temperature increases of 4.5 to 7°C 
increase above present by 2100 in the absence of climate policy (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Increase in global mean temperature in degrees Centigrade (relative to 2000; CCSP scenarios in 
green, SRES in blue, Shell in red). Source: Prinn et al (2011). 5 
 
 
The study included scenarios where decisions about global energy use were shaped by concerns about 
the environment. As IPCC SRES scenarios have story lines instead of explicit representation of the 
policies, their scenarios A1FI, A1B, and A2 can be interpreted as those where concerns of climate change 
have not significantly shaped energy policy. The same is true for the Shell’s “Scramble” scenario. US 
CCSP has a specific no-climate-policy scenario, denoted by “REF” on Figure 2. The risks associated with 
these levels of temperature increase are not fully understood. However, existing scientific knowledge 
(IPCC, 2007) justifies at least slowing down the anthropogenic contribution to climate change. 
The figure also includes the temperature results for some scenarios shaped by climate concerns. The 
set from the US CCSP developed emissions scenarios (Level 1-4) were formulated in terms of radiative 
forcings that intended to avoid exceeding specific CO2 concentration targets– 450, 550, 650, 750 ppm 
against a scenario without explicit policy (REF)
5. The Shell’s “Blueprints” and “Blueprints without 
carbon capture and storage (blue_excl CCS)” and the IPCC B1 scenarios do not include specific global 
concentration targets but they are scenarios where energy choices are shaped by climate change concerns. 
These scenarios where energy choices are shaped by climate concerns maintain global temperature 
increases to a range of just under 2°C to under 4°C above present through 2100. 
 
2.  Climate stabilization with a global participation of countries 
Stabilization of GHG concentrations at levels often discussed in international negotiations requires 
very substantial emissions cuts. Figure 3 illustrates the difficulty of reaching some proposed targets, as 
some stringent targets are already exceeded or will be exceeded in not-so-distant future. As can be seen, 
the world has already almost passed the often-discussed 450 CO2e target for the Kyoto Protocol gases
6. 
                                                 
5 In some cases targets might be expressed in terms of concentration of CO2 only (in ppm of CO2), in others targets 
include all GHGs, hence are expressed in terms ppm of CO2 equivalent, or CO2e.  
6 It is important to distinguish between the concentrations of all GHGs and a subset of the Kyoto gases. In 2005, 
Kyoto gases concentration was about 430 ppm CO2e, while for all GHGs concentration was around 460 ppm CO2e. 6 
 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between different CO2e concentration targets (Kyoto gases) and concentrations in 
the no-policy projections. Source: EMF-22 (Clarke et al, 2009). 
 
Still what are the economic costs of achieving substantial reductions?  These depend on who 
participates and the efficiency of the policies used to achieve reductions. We start by reporting the costs 
and consequences of climate stabilization assuming a so called “first-best” world, with full international 
participation, a perfect international carbon market including all GHGs and foresight of future climate 
obligations. In reality, departures from all or many of these assumptions are likely to occur and would 
result in potentially higher economic penalties and inefficiencies of various kinds. Nonetheless such an 
ideal case is useful to understand the basic dynamics of the system and to have a benchmark for the 
discussion of more realistic cases. 
It is important to distinguish between who is incurring the cost of mitigation from who is actually 
implementing mitigating activities. For example, mitigation can happen in developing countries, but it 
can be financed with some offset scheme financed by developed countries. Allocating internationally a 
given amount (typically determined by the stabilization target) of allowable emissions is going to affect 
the cost and who pays. This distributional issue would be extremely relevant both in the case of taxes and 
in that of permits. There are many ways to distribute the shares of emissions reduction among 
participating countries. One can propose reductions based on equal percent reduction, or GDP per capita, 
or population, or emissions intensity, on historical responsibility or many other alternative ways. There is 
a vast literature that analyzes these types of burden sharing schemes. As any of the schemes benefits (or 
imposes the cost on) countries unevenly in different aspects of socio-economic indicators, there is no 
unique formula that would satisfy all participating countries. It is sometimes argued that in order to reach 
global economic efficiency (i.e., reaching a target at a lowest global economic cost), emissions should be 
priced at same rate across different countries. This can be achieved by imposing the same GHG price 7 
 
across the countries through a system of carbon taxes, or by allowing a full trade in emissions permits 
among all countries and all sectors of the economy
7. 
(i) Emissions and Emissions Prices  
Emission reductions and carbon prices results for the different models and under the different targets 
are reported in Table 1. In the EMF-22 exercise the global carbon price in 2020 that would be in line with 
a 650 ppm CO2e
8 target ranges between $3 and $20 per metric ton of CO2 (in year 2005 dollars). Carbon 
price increases to 10-52 2005$/tCO2 when considering 550 ppm CO2e target. Allowing for overshooting 
the target and then bringing back emissions to the 550 ppm target by the end of the century, would bring 
the price in 2020 down to 4-51 2005$/tCO2. When considering the 450 ppm CO2e target only two models 
find a solution for the target when no overshoot is allowed; for this two models the price is above 100 
2005$/tCO2. When overshooting is considered, half of the models are able to find a solution with the 
price of carbon ranges between 15-263 2005$/tCO2.  
 
  Change in CO2 Emissions 
in 2020 relative to 2000 
Change in CO2 
Emissions in 2050 
relative to 2000 
Price of Carbon in 2020 
(2005 USD per ton C)* 
450 ppm CO2e 
(36% of models) 
-67% to 31%  -13% to -92%  15-263 2005 USD ton C 
550 ppm CO2e  -4% to 50%  -67 % to 52%  4-52 2005 USD ton C 
650 ppm CO2e  30% to 57%  -16% to 108%  3-20 2005 USD ton C 
*Ranges included the overshoot and not-to-exceed cases. 
Table 1. Change in CO2 emissions and price of carbon in 2020. Source: Authors elaboration of the EMF-
22 dataset. 
 
The reason why models are less capable of finding a feasible set of actions for more stringent targets 
resides in the fact that we are already very near to 450 ppm CO2e. Staying below 450 ppm CO2e would 
require an immediate and almost complete de-carbonization of the economy. This, under realistic 
assumptions, is likely to be technically unfeasible. Similarly, going back to the target after overshooting 
implies large deployment of negative emissions technologies. Not all models envision the deployment of 
technologies enabling us to remove CO2 from the atmosphere (for example, biomass power generation 
                                                 
7 For a discussion when emissions trading may, for some countries, lead to a decrease in welfare (or total 
macroeconomic consumption) due to the terms-of-trade effect, see Babiker et al (2004). A discussion of a similar 
potential welfare worsening in presence of externalities (e.g., energy taxes) can be found in Paltsev et al (2007). 
8 As we are reviewing the “first best” world we are assuming that all GHGs are taxed. Hence we use the CO2 
equivalency to aggregate all GHGs. 8 
 
coupled with CO2 capture and storage). These technologies deployed at a massive scale would allow 
bringing down concentrations emission pathways later in the century
9. 
As the “first best” assumption allows for the full trading in emissions permits, the 2020 carbon price 
will increase over time at a discount rate because of perfect substitutability of trading in emissions permits 
and other financial instruments. Different modeling groups assume different discount rates, usually in the 
range of 3-5%, so the carbon price would also increase over time at the same rate. 
Looking at emission reductions needed to be in line with the different targets (first and second 
column in Table 1) it is important to notice that, for the near- and medium-term, there is not much 
difference in appropriate emission prices for 550 and 650 ppm—but very large emission reductions are 
required, even in the short run for the 450 ppm CO2e scenario. 
(ii) Policy Costs 
The carbon price might be a misleading indicator for the economic cost of climate policy as it does 
not univocally translates in macroeconomic or welfare impacts (for a detailed discussion, see, for 
example, Appendix B in Paltsev et al, 2009). Indeed economists usually measure the cost in terms of 
welfare loss (or loss in consumption measured as equivalent variation, that roughly can be interpreted as 
the macroeconomic combination of the cost of producing with more efficient technologies, or cleaner but 
more expensive fuels, the forgone benefits to households from cutting back on energy use, etc.). GDP loss 
is another popular measure for the cost of a policy, as many of the models used for climate policy analysis 
do not report welfare
10. Most of the studies focus on emissions mitigation costs as climate benefits and 
potential ancillary non-climate benefits of GHG mitigation are much more uncertain. 
EMF-22 reports the net present value of GDP costs (discounted at 5%) in the range of $2-24 trillion 
(year 2005 US dollars) for 650 ppm CO2e stabilization, in the range of $16-45 trillion 2005$ for 550 ppm 
CO2e stabilization, and $55-125 trillion 2005$ for 450 ppm CO2e stabilization (losses as shares of the 
world GDP in net present value are discussed in the next section). 
US CCSP (Clarke et al, 2007) does also reports the cost of climate policy as a percentage reduction in 
the global GDP, but rather than a net present values, reports the loss in different periods of time. The most 
stringent stabilization level in this study is roughly equal to 550 ppm CO2e (450 ppm when only CO2 
contributions are considered). The loss of the world GDP in comparison to a scenario with no climate 
policy is in the range of 1-4% in 2040 and 1-16% in 2100. 
                                                 
9 Currently, these negative carbon technologies are highly speculative. For a discussion concerning the potential role 
of bioenergy and carbon capture and storage technologies on the costs of stringent policy see Tavoni and Tol (2010). 
For a discussion about potential technological and economic obstacles for air capture technologies see Ranjan 
(2010). 
10 As GDP measures not only consumption, but also government spending, investment and net trade, it is less 
satisfactory indicator of cost of a policy. For additional discussion, see Appendix B in Paltsev et al (2009). 9 
 
Emissions pricing will induce emissions reductions in the sectors where these reductions are cheapest. 
Models have different views about the timing of emissions reduction, but most of the projections agree 
that the power generation sector will be the first area where less-carbon-emitting (e.g., natural gas) or 
almost-zero-carbon-emitting technologies (e.g., nuclear, hydro, renewables) are introduced because of 
various economic substitutes that already exist in this sector
11. Less-emitting technologies in 
transportation (e.g., gasoline/electric hybrid vehicles, more fuel efficient conventional vehicles) and 
energy-saving technologies in buildings and industry are also promising, but currently look more 
expensive. Substantial reductions in GHG emissions in agriculture and cement production are also costly, 
but to achieve climate stabilization, emissions from all sectors of the economy need to be reduced 
drastically. For more stringent climate stabilization targets, the reductions are needed to begin in the near 
future, and if the models are correct, some very ambitious targets (i.e., 450 ppm CO2e) might be already 
out of reach. Previous economic analyses have estimated that there may be significant and relatively 
inexpensive and cost effective opportunities for protecting and enhancing global forest carbon stocks. 
Linking REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) could be extremely 
beneficial as it is a low cost carbon abatement opportunity, although several implementation issues would 
need to be overcome. Deforestation mitigation could lower the total costs of climate stabilization policies 
by around 10-25% depending on the policy scenario, and could enable additional reductions of about 20 
ppm CO2e with no added costs compared to an energy-sector only policy (Bosetti et al, 2011). However, 
most of rainforest countries have not yet developed the implementation capacity for monitoring and 
enforcing country scale projects and this might diminish the role of REDD in the next decade.  
Deferring the bulk of mitigation action to later periods can make sense if we are optimistic about the 
availability, cost and speed of deployment of low-emissions technologies. A further degree of freedom is 
represented by negative emissions technologies. However, relying on a technological future which might 
not evolve as expected comes at a risk of missing the target completely. 
 
3.  Incomplete participation and delayed action 
Carbon prices as well as mitigation costs depend critically on assumptions about (1) innovation and 
the availability of low-carbon alternatives to conventional fossil fuels, (2) flexibility of substitution within 
the energy-economic system, (3) the credibility of future policies that triggers long term investments and 
(4) the immediate action of all countries or of major emitters. In this section we investigate the latter 
crucial assumption and how it might influence results presented so far. 
For a given stabilization target, delayed global action implies a higher post peak reduction rate. Short 
term inaction would then result in a required pace of de-carbonization so rapid that replacement of capital 
                                                 
11 Jacoby et al (2012) provide an assessment of the role of natural gas in a potential U.S. climate policy considering 
recent shale gas development. 10 
 
would need to be abrupt and very costly. Only under the optimistic assumption of large-scale CO2 
removal, the tradeoff between costs and timing of action can be less severe. If the world continues 
according to business-as-usual until 2030, stabilization at 550 ppm CO2e will no longer be possible, 
according to most models. The target might still be feasible if ambitious mitigation policies at global scale 
are postponed until 2020, but this delay could substantially scale up global mitigation cost. Climate policy 
aiming at 450 ppm CO2e target leaves even less leeway for a delay of cooperative mitigation action 
(Edenhofer et al, 2009). 
Rather than complete global inaction, more likely we will face asymmetry of actions across world 
regions. Significant mitigation actions are planned to take place in some developed countries within the 
next decade (e.g., the EU has committed to the 20% reduction below 1990 levels target by 2020). 
However, it is unlikely that emerging economies will make substantial emissions reductions in the 
coming decade. 
Even asymmetric participation may rule out some of the more stringent targets, while scaling-up the 
global costs of those stabilization scenarios that still remain feasible. Inaction in developing countries 
clashes with the fact that the bulk of emissions in the next decades will be coming from non-OECD 
countries. If CO2 emissions are not regulated in some major emitting countries, two inefficiencies arise. A 
static inefficiency, as mitigation does not take place where mitigation costs are lowest. A dynamic 
inefficiency, as unregulated countries are those where most of new investments will take place. Investing 
instead in fossil technologies, fast growing countries eventually lock-in in these long-lived technologies 
(e.g., a new coal plant may be in use for 50 years) and later conversion to low-carbon technologies 
becomes more costly, or simply impossible if early scrapping is deemed unfeasible. Finally, non-
participating countries might react to lower fossil fuel prices, deriving from the contraction in the 
demand, and increase their emissions, thus partially offsetting the environmental benefit of early movers. 
One solution frequently pointed out by economist is the use of incentive systems (as for example an 
evolution of the Clean Development Mechanism) to induce reductions in developing countries while 
limiting leakage (see Bosetti and Frankel, 2009, for a detailed discussion of political feasibility of 
alternative targets). 
For a more detailed discussion we report again results from to the latest Energy Modeling Forum 
exercise (EMF-22, Clarke et al, 2009) that looked extensively into the issue of asymmetry of participation 
to a climate agreement and how this would affect the feasibility of stabilization scenarios as well as the 
costs. Figure 4 reports the results in terms of percentage of loss in the world GDP (in net present value) 
for different models, different targets, different emission pathways (including and excluding 
overshooting), and for different levels of participation (full and delayed). 
The key result, consistent across models, is that the 450 ppm CO2e stabilization scenarios is basically 
unfeasible if only OECD coalition immediately undertake mitigation action, while BRICs and the rest of 11 
 
the world remain on their business-as-usual path until 2030 and 2050, respectively. Half of the models 
cannot find a feasible set of investment actions for the 550 ppm CO2e scenario as well, when participation 
of developing countries is delayed. Overshooting becomes critical for the feasibility of this intermediate 
target and the price of carbon that OECD countries face in 2020 increases, in average, by a factor of three. 
There is a wide range of disagreement across models, depending on assumptions about flexibility of 
substitution across technologies and, once more, on the assumptions concerning the availability of 
negative emissions technologies (green versus blue markers in Figure 4 distinguish models with and 
without bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECS) technologies).  

















































































Figure 4. Policy costs for the EMF22 data set by model run. Green colors indicate models with BECS and 
blue models without BECS. FP=full, immediate participation of Developing Countries, DP=delayed 
participation of Developing Countries. STAB=target not to exceed, OS=target can be overshot. Source: 
Tavoni and Tol, 2010. 
 
More generally, the set of technologies that will be available and the speed at which they will be 
deployed significantly affect not only the costs of any climate policy, but also the time we can wait 
without entering an irreversible path. The stricter the climate objective or the later the mitigation effort 
starts, the more we will need to resort to technologies which have potential implications that we have not 
yet fully understood. This obviously requires a careful and realistic estimation of the costs and potentials 12 
 
of these technologies, the research development and demonstration requirements to make them available 
with a reasonable level of certainty, and the potential barriers and external costs that might be linked to 
their deployment on a large-scale. 
How do projections we have discussed so far compare with the current state of climate negotiations? 
Instead of an ideal global system, countries agreed on submitting their “pledges” during the meetings in 
Copenhagen in 2009 and Cancun in 2010, where most of developed countries submitted their emissions 
reductions targets relative to emissions in 1990, 2000, or 2005
12. Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, South Africa 
and South Korea proposed the reductions relative to their business-as-usual emissions
13, and China and 
India submitted carbon intensity reduction targets (i.e., CO2 emissions per unit of GDP). Some of the 
pledges have conditions attached, such as the provision of finance and technology or ambitious actions 
from other countries; some pledges were provided as ranges. This leads to a degree of freedom in their 
implementation and a range of potential outcomes rather than a single estimate.
14 
The implications of these pledges for 2020 global emissions will hence depend on what pledges are 
implemented and what rules will be applied. Many scientific groups have estimated global emissions in 
2020 based on the Copenhagen Accord pledges. The 2010 Emission Gap Report (den Elzen et al, 2010) 
collects these estimates and shows that, on one hand, emissions in 2020 could be as low as 49 GtCO2e 
(range: 47-51 GtCO2e) when countries implement their conditional pledges in their more stringent 
declination. On the other hand, they could be as high as 53 GtCO2e (range: 52-57 GtCO2e) when 
countries implement unconditional pledges in their more lenient declination. 
Emission pathways consistent with a “likely” chance of meeting the 2°C limit generally peak before 
2020, have emission levels in 2020 around 44 GtCO2e (range: 39-44 GtCO2e), have steep emission 
reductions afterwards and/or reach negative emissions in the longer term. Hence, the ranges implied by 
Copenhagen pledges do not necessarily rule out the 2°C target, as the two ranges are not severely distant 
from one another. However, as previously discussed, the larger the overshoot will be, the faster the de-
carbonization in the second half of the century will be needed, with all the implications that we have 
discussed above. 
The consideration that the 2° C target could be out of reach should not be a reason to inaction. Even 
limited actions towards reducing GHG concentrations result in a substantial reduction in risk of exceeding 
a certain temperature threshold. Table 2 (adapted from Webster et al, 2009) illustrates the benefits of at 
least some mitigation actions in comparison to the no-action scenario. For example, stabilization at 800 
ppm reduces the probability of exceeding 4°C in 2100 to 7 percent from 85 percent in the no-policy 
                                                 
12 Typical targets for developed regions like the U.S., EU, Canada, Japan are in the range of 20 percent GHG 
reduction relative to 2000 levels. 
13 Targets expressed with respect to baseline emissions are particularly tricky as they can be interpreted in very 
different ways depending on the baseline projection adopted. 
14 The reader is referred to the UNEP website for an overview of all pledges http://www.unep.org/climatepledges/ 13 
 
scenario. Therefore, even a limited action directed at GHG reductions by a subset of regions will 
appreciably reduce the probability of more extreme levels of temperature increase. 
 
Table 2 . Cumulative probability of global average surface warming from 2000 to 2100 (400 MIT IGSM 
forecasts per case). Source: Webster et al (2009). 
 
4.  Who bears the costs of abatement? 
As discussed in the previous section, the current state of climate negotiations does not give high 
hopes for universal participation. When regions or economic sectors are excluded, the costs of meeting 
the global target are higher in participating countries for any given emission target. When policy 
instruments deviate from an idealized economy-wide GHG tax or pricing, the costs of meeting a target 
also increase substantially (for a discussion when GHG pricing or cap-and-trade system is replaced with 
renewable energy requirements, see, for example, Morris et al, 2010). Absent near universal participation, 
stringent climate stabilization goals are quite costly or not achievable, because economic activity and 
emissions would shift to nations that do not sign the agreement
15. Even with all nations taking on 
commitments, the policies would require a complex system of financial transfers to simultaneously satisfy 
widely-discussed burden-sharing goals. Ultimately, differences in the costs of abatement between 
countries will depend on their energy, industrial and agricultural systems (that would determine marginal 
costs of abatement in the sectors), emissions allocations, policy instruments, and financial transfers. 
Two interacting equity concerns would have to be dealt with in seeking the global emissions goal. 
First, incentives and compensation for developing country participation will be required, consistent with 
                                                 
15 Most studies report carbon leakage from the Kyoto Protocol targets being in the range of 5-15%. For a discussion 
of estimates of carbon leakage, see IPCC (2007) section 11.7.2.1 at: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch11s11-7-2-1.html  14 
 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Second, since mitigation costs and 
compensation payments by developed countries will be substantial, they also will need to find an 
acceptable burden-sharing arrangement among themselves. Simple emissions reduction rules are 
incapable of dealing with the highly varying circumstances of different countries.  
Successful climate negotiations will need to be grounded in a full understanding of the substantial 
amounts at stake. For example, for 50% global emissions reductions by 2050 relative to 2000, Jacoby et 
al (2009) show that if developing countries (including China and India) are fully compensated for the 
costs of mitigation in the period to 2050, then the average welfare cost to developed countries is around 
2% of GDP in 2020 (relative to reference level), rising to 10% in 2050. The implied financial transfers are 
large—over $400 billion per year in 2020 and rising to around $3 trillion in 2050. The United States’ 
share of these transfers is $200 billion in 2020, and over a trillion dollars in 2050
16.  
With less than full compensation the welfare burden on developing countries would rise, but the 
international financial transfers would remain of unprecedented scale. It is an extreme assumption that 
developing countries will demand complete compensation. If, as is likely, they are willing to bear some 
costs, then the welfare burden on the developed countries will be reduced. Also, the burden is lowered 
somewhat if compensation only covers direct mitigation costs and not other losses associated with the 
policy, as might come through terms-of-trade effects. In the process the required financial transfers are 
reduced as well, but they remain large
17. 
In general, the cost of mitigation is higher in energy-exporting countries, while energy-importers have 
some counter-effects in terms-of-trade due to a lower fossil fuel prices that allow them to reduce the cost 
of participation. The welfare costs can be both substantial and wildly different across regions depending 
on the allocation methods and policy instruments chosen
18. What makes matters worse is that climate 
change related damages vary wildly as well but in a very different way, adding up to the complexity of 
the problem. For success in dealing with the climate threat any negotiation of long-term goals and paths to 





                                                 
16 Given large budget deficits at present, these transfers seem even more unrealistic. Even one of the Copenhagen 
Accord goals of $100 billion per year by 2020 for climate financing from “a wide variety of sources” seems quite 
questionable at this point, which illustrates a degree of difficulty to reach a global agreement when developing 
countries are expecting to get help with GHG emissions mitigation. 
17 In this case the annual financial transfers to developing countries are lower by $77 billion in 2020 and by $108 
billion in 2050 (Jacoby et al, 2009). 




5.  Conclusions 
We summarize below main conclusions. 
•  Without significant emissions mitigation actions, the likely atmospheric temperature 
increase is projected to range between 2.5 and 6° C by the end of the century. The risks 
associated with temperature increases above 2°C are not fully understood. Existing 
scientific knowledge justifies at least slowing down the anthropogenic contribution to 
climate change. 
•  The 2°C target, the goal identified in the Copenhagen Accord (COP 15) and reiterated in 
the Cancun Agreements (COP 16), is very ambitious given current atmospheric 
concentrations and inertia in the energy and climate system. The Copenhagen pledges for 
2020 still keep the 2°C target within a reach, but very aggressive actions would be 
needed immediately after that. 
•  In 2000 global GHG emissions were about 40 gigatonnes (Gt), a successful 
implementation of the Copenhagen Accord is expected to result in about 50 Gt in 2020. 
To be on a 2°C target path, by 2050 most models project the global emissions in the 
range of 15-20 Gt. Some models envision a development of (still unproven) negative 
carbon technologies that would allow the postponement of some mitigation action. 
•  Postponing the mitigation actions, especially in emerging countries where large portions 
of energy capital is being installed for the first time, can be very costly. Extra cost 
associated with the delayed actions increases non-linearly with the stringency of the 
target, and some more stringent targets become infeasible if action is postponed. 
•  To reduce the cost while achieving an equitable sharing of them, decisions about where 
emissions reductions are taken and how they are paid for should be separated. Emission 
mitigation should take place where it is most efficient. Equity considerations can be 
addressed through agreed upon mechanisms that result in transfers from those better able 
to pay to those with less ability to bear these costs. Negotiating such a transfer scheme is 
likely one of the most difficult aspects of reaching agreement. 
•  A global carbon tax starting at 20 USD in 2020 and rising at 3-5 % per year would be in 
line with more lenient targets. Even these less severe targets can still substantially reduce 
the risk of reaching high temperature increases. 
•  Innovation, both on energy efficiency and alternative energy sources, is needed. Carbon 
pricing (e.g., carbon taxes or a price established through a cap and trade system) would 16 
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